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We study theinteractionbetween productive and nonproductive savings in an
economy that grows in the long rundueto endogenous improvements in labor productivity.
As in the neoclassical growth setting with overlapping generations studied by Tirole (1985),
asset bubbles can exist in an economy with endogenous growth provided they are not too
large and that the growth rate in the equilibrium without bubbles exceeds the interest rate.
Since the growth rate in the bubbleless equilibrium is endogenous, the existence condition
reflects parameters of tastes and technology. We find that bubbles, when they exist, retard
the growth of the economy, perhaps even in the long run, and reduce the welfare of all
generations born after the bubble appears.
x
IuL1yUr.J I i1JI4W4 'jvizcIVh J1VILIQ11
Department of Economics Woodrow Wilson School
ri iUI.LVI1 U11LViLL rriiicvuiiUIIivci
Princeton, NJ 08544 Princeton, NJ 08544 ._iTT.!_ ..t 'n_I__.. —— ailu univcrsiy or i oicyo anu 1DCI
NBER  Working  Paper  #4CKI4 
February  1992 
ASSET  BUBBLES  AND  ENDOGENOUS  GROWTH 
ABSTRACT 
We  study  the  interaction  between  productive  and  nonproductive  savings  in  an 
economy  that  grows  in  the  long  run  due  to  endogenous  improvements  in  labor  productivity. 
As  in  the  neoclassical  growth  setting  with  overlapping  generations  studied  by Tile  (1985), 
asset bubbles  can  exist  in  an economy  with  endogenous  growth  provided  they  arc not  too 
large  and  that  the  growth  rate  in  the  equilibrium  without  bubbles  exceeds  the  interest  rate. 
Since  the  growth  rate  in  the  bubbleless  equilibrium  is  endogenous,  the  existence  condition 
reflects  parameters  of tastes  and  technology.  We  find  that  bubbles,  when  they  exist,  retard 
the  growth  of  the  economy,  perhaps  even  in  the  long  run,  and  reduce  the  welfare  of all 
generations  born  after  the  bubble  appears. 
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and  NBER I. Introduction
Can the market price of an asset deviate from market fundamentals (i.e.,
the present discounted value of dividend payments) in a world populated by
rational, far-sighted investors? Tirole (1982) has shown that it cannot, if
the economy comprises a finite number of infinitely-lived traders, while
Vallace (1980) and Tirole (1985) have shown that the same is true in a
non-growing economy no matter how long are investors' trading horizons. But
Tirole (19S5) and Veil (19T) have established that bubblesu sometimes can
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A rational investor will only hold an asset priced differently than its
fundamentals if she expects that the bubble component will yield at least a
normal rate of return; i.e., that it will grow at least at the real rate of
interest. But if bubbles grow at the rate of interest in every period,
eventually their value will exceed the income of the young generations who
must purchase these assets from the old, unless the income of these
generations is growing at least as fast. Tirole (1985) investigated the
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Hp rp1t.prI th pyistntptnnditinn to the intertemnoral efficiency of the
general equilibrium without bubbles.2 Of course, in the Diamond economy with
a neoclassical production function and no technological progress, per capita
incomes stagnate in the long run.
IVeil (1987) used a similar framework to study "stochastically-bursting
biihhl es
2See Tirole (1990) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch.5) for excellent
.LUL,iUUUtbiUH I() UILLb iC.IULV.
I.  Introduction 
Can  the  market  price  of  an  asset  deviate  from  market  fundamentals  (i.e., 
the  present  discounted  value  of  dividend  payments)  in  a  world  populated  by 
rational,  far-  sighted  investors  ?  Tirole  (1982)  has  shown  that  it  cannot,  if 
the  economy comprises  a  finite  number  of  infinitely-lived  traders,  while 
Wallace  (1980)  and  Tirole  (1985)  have  shown  that  the  same is  true  in  a 
non-growing  economy no  matter  how  long  are  investors’  trading  horizons.  But 
Tirole  (1985)  and  Veil  (1987)  have  established  that  “bubbles”  sometimes  can 
exist  in  the  general  equilibrium  of  a  growing  economy with  overlapping 
generations. 
A rational  investor  will  only  hold  an  asset  priced  differently  than  its 
fundamentals  if  she  expects  that  the  bubble  component  will  yield  at  least  a 
normal  rate  of  return;  i.e.,  that  it  will  grow  at  least  at  the  real  rate  of 
interest.  But  if  bubbles  grow  at  the  rate  of  interest  in  every  period, 
eventually  their  value  will  exceed  the  income  of  the  young  generations  who 
must  purchase  these  assets  from  the  old,  unless  the  income  of  these 
generations  is  growing  at  least  as  fast.  Tirole  (1985)  investigated  the 
conditions  under  which  a  Diamond  (1965)  economy with  an  expanding  population 
would  grow  fast  enough  to  allow  for  the  existence  of  bubbles  in  asset  prices.! 
Be  related  the  existence  condition  to  the  intertemporal  efficiency  of  the 
general  equilibrium  without  bubbles.2  Of  course,  in  the  Diamond  economy with 
a  neoclassical  production  function  and  no  technological  progress,  per  capita 
incomes  stagnate  in  the  long  run. 
‘Veil  (1987)  used  a  similar  framework  to  study  “stochastically-bursting 
bubbles.  I1 
2See  Tirole  (1990)  and  Blanchard  and  Fischer  (1989,  ch.5)  for  excellent 
introductions  to  this  literature. -2-
In this paper, we extend Tirole's (1985) results to include economies
that grow in the long run at an endogenous rate. As is well known by now,
long-run growth can be sustained in an economy in which real returns to
whatever capital goods are being accumulated (physical, knowledge, or human)
are bounded from below by a number that exceeds the discount rate. In other
words, there must be non-decreasing returns to accumulable factors in the long
---I__ _._t__
run. 'rnese non-aecreasing returns may oe innerent to tne proauction
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1986. 1990; Lucas 1988). Ve choose a simple specification that includes
externalities from physical capital (following Romer 1986) and investigate the
existence conditions for bubbles and the effects that bubbles have on the
growth rate of the economy and on the welfare of the various generations of
agents.3 Ye find that the conditions under which bubbles can exist are
similar to those identified by Tirole (1985), but that bubbles are not so
benign in this setting as they are in the Diamond economy with an exogenous
growth rate.
TT L n- n..Lt.1 IL. P.UIdJtIUILU LtUUIeL1KOI1QU1YIILL1QUb DUUUIb
4 1TIfliffiAflel(1Q\ On+C 1I rr +%IA TAr1EIIC'Fhsv urrr f'ATICIIlnA .ac..II.JsI..AS U JIJ j a4I U S S T 'S ¶.J S Un U j1¼. A SVU U S S(.# JflUS
andsave when they are vonn. nd enjoy the fruits of their savings when they 0I —--a--— - -.
areold. Each period a new generation of young is born, endowed with a fixed
amount of potential working time, which it supplies inelastically in the labor
3Ve choose this specification with capital externalities to bring out the
similarities with the Tiro].e (1985) analysis of the Diamond economy. But the
existence conditions for bubbies ae simIlar in economies with othr sources
of endogenous long-run growth; see Yanagawa (1991).
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In  this  paper,  we extend  Tirole’s  (1985)  results  to  include  economies 
that  grow  in  the  long  run  at  an  endogenous  rate.  As  is  well  known  by  now, 
long-run  growth  can  be  sustained  in  an  economy in  which  real  returns  to 
whatever  capital  goods  are  being  accumulated  (physical,  knowledge,  or  human) 
are  bounded  from  below  by  a  number  that  exceeds  the  discount  rate.  In  other 
words,  there  must  be  non-decreasing  returns  to  accumulable  factors  in  the  long 
run.  These  non-decreasing  returns  may be  inherent  to  the  production 
technology  (e.g.,  Rebel0  1991,  Jones  and  Banuelli  1990)  or  they  may arise  due 
to  externalities  generated  in  the  process  of  capital  accumulation  (e.g.,  Bomer 
1986,  1990;  Lucas  1988).  Ve  choose  a  simple  specification  that  includes 
externalities  from  physical  capital  (following  Romer  1986)  and  investigate  the 
existence  conditions  for  bubbles  and  the  effects  that  bubbles  have  on  the 
growth  rate  of  the  economy and  on  the  welfare  of  the  various  generations  of 
agents.3  Ye  find  that  the  conditions  under  which  bubbles  can  exist  are 
similar  to  those  identified  by  Tirole  (1985),  but  that  bubbles  are  not  so 
benign  in  this  setting  as  they  are  in  the  Diamond  economy with  an  exogenous 
growth  rate. 
II.  A Diamond-Romer  Economy Vithout  Bubbles 
As  in  Diamond  (1965),  agents  live  for  two  periods.  They  work,  consume, 
and  save  when  they  are  young,  and  enjoy  the  fruits  of  their  savings  when  they 
are  old.  Each  period  a  new generation  of  young  is  born,  endowed  with  a  fixed 
amount  of  potential  working  time,  which  it  supplies  inelastically  in  the  labor 
3Ve choose  this  specification  with  capital  externalities  to  bring  out  the 
similarities  with  the  Tirole  (1985)  analysis  of  the  Diamond  economy.  But  the 
existence  conditions  for  bubbles  are  similar  in  economies  with  other  sources 
of  endogenous  long-run  growth;  see  Yanagawa  (1991). -3-
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Vssnme for now that canital goods are the only store of value. Frir CV -—
simplicity,we assume that the economy's population is constant through time
and equal to 2L.
A representative member of the generation born at time tconsumes
units of the homogeneous final good when young, and units of this good
when old. She chooses her consumption profile to maximize a utility function,
U(c c0+i), subject to an interteniporal budget constraint. Letting ri be
the rate of return (or real interest rate) on savings invested at time t, the
constraint can e written as
cot+1
(1) 1 + rt+i
where is the individual's labor income earned at time t.
The consumer's optimization yields equality between the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution, U1/U2, and one plus the interest rate, 1
— as usuai. mis equation generates n iWiiibviIt i.uiiciuu,
—
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Firmshire the available labor force, L (half the population, namely the
young generation), and the available aggregate capital stock, Kt, and produce
the homogeneous output, ''•Afirm i that rents units of capital from the
old generation that owns it and that employs L young workers generates net
output (after accounting for capital depreciation) of
-  3- 
market.  They  use  their  labor  income  to  buy  output  for  consumption  and 
investment  purposes  and  to  purchase  the  existing  capital  stock  from  the  old. 
Ve  assume for  now  that  capital  goods  are  the  only  store  of  value.  For 
simplicity,  we  assume  that  the  economy’s  population  is  constant  through  time 
and  equal  to  2L. 
A representative  member of  the  generation  born  at  time  t  consumes cYt 
units  of  the  homogeneous  final  good  when  young,  and  cot+l  units  of  this  good 
when  old.  She  chooses  her  consumption  profile  to  maximize  a  utility  function, 
UCcyt  3  %t+l)  9  subject  to  an  intertemporal  budget  constraint.  Letting  rt+l  be 
the  rate  of  return  (or  real  interest  rate)  on  savings  invested  at  time  t,  the 
constraint  can  be  written  as 
(1)  Cyt  + 
Cot+l  = 
l  + rt+l 
It  ’ 
where  It  is  the  individual’s  labor  income  earned  at  time  t. 
The  consumer’s  optimization  yields  equality  between  the  marginal  rate  of 
intertemporal  substitution,  Ur/IJ2,  and  one  plus  the  interest  rate,  1  +  rt+l, 
as  usual.  This  equation  generates  an  implicit  savings  function,  st  = 
S(ItJt+J  l  Ve  assume  henceforth  that  individual  preferences  represented  by 
U(a)  are  homothetic.  Then  s(JIt,rt+l)  =  Wt,rt+l)  l 
Firms  hire  the  available  labor  force,  L  (half  the  population,  namely  the 
young  generation),  and  the  available  aggregate  capital  stock,  Kt,  and  produce 
the  homogeneous  output,  Yt.  A firm  i  that  rents  Ki  units  of  capital  from  the 
old  generation  that  owns  it  and  that  employs  Li  young  workers  generates  net 
output  (after  accounting  for  capital  depreciation)  of -I —
F[K, A(K)L'],
where A(.) represents labor productivity, A' >0.Here we have incorporated a
positive spillover from the size of the aggregate capital stock to the
productivity of workers in individual firms, in the manner suggested by Arrow
(1962) and formalized by Sheshinski (1967) and Ranier (1986).4 Ve assume that
fli 11!L -— -I -II
exnioits constant returns to scaie ana tnat rirms oenave competitively.
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azreatecauital stock and thus on the Droductivitv of its own workers.
Thus, each firm hires capital up to the point where its (private) marginal
product equals the rental rate, r, and it hires workers until their marginal
product equals the wage rate. In view of the homogeneity of degree one of
F(.,.), this gives the following relationships at the aggregate level:
(2) Fi(Kt, AtL) f'(kt)
— n/v v n Iv h — \1_ t,I1t
wt Ekflt,At) - tnlt,
-t't'
where A4A(K4'j, k4 K/AL (caDital per unit of efficiency laborL and b t.V ,
f(k)F(K/AL, 1). Combining (2) and (3) gives a relationship between
equilibrium factor prices,
As we noted in the introduction, we are not wedded to this specification of
tne tecnnology. Alternative tormulations that preserve long-run incentives
for capital accumulation would serve equally well. For a general discussion . ._ 1_____.L -_.J.1_f -1 WII4 1 iieueu u bUL1fliong-run gruwiiin a mouei01capuai
accumulation,see Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.2).
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Y;  = F[K;,  A(Kt)Li], 
where  A(.)  represents  labor  productivity,  A’  >  0.  Here  we  have  incorporated  a 
positive  spillover  from  the  size  of  the  aggregate  capital  stock  to  the 
productivity  of  workers  in  individual  firms,  in  the  manner  suggested  by  Arrow 
(1962)  and  formalized  by  Sheshinski  (1967)  and  Bomer  (1986).4  Ve  assume  that 
I’(.,.)  exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale  and  that  firms  behave  competitively. 
In  hiring  capital,  the  individual  firm  ignores  its  tiny  influence  on  the 
aggregate  capital  stock  and  thus  on  the  productivity  of  its  own  workers. 
Thus,  each  firm  hires  capital  up  to  the  point  where  its  (private)  marginal 
product  equals  the  rental  rate,  rt,  and  it  hires  workers  until  their  marginal 
product  equals  the  wage  rate.  In  view  of  the  homogeneity  of  degree  one  of 
F(Y),  h’  g’  t  1s  Ives  the  following  relationships  at  the  aggregate  level: 
(2) 
(3) 
rt  q  Fl(Kt,  A$)  =  f’(kJ 
Wt  = F&s  A$)  -  KtF1(Kt, A$)  =  f&J  -  ktf’(kt), 
where  At  =  A(KJ,  k,  3  Kt/AtL  (capital  per  unit  of  efficiency  labor),  and 
f(kJ  z F(Kt/AtL,  1).  Combining  (2)  and  (3)  gives  a  relationship  between 
equilibrium  factor  prices, 
‘As  we  noted  in  the  introduction,  we  are  not  wedded  to  this  specification  of 
the  technology.  Alternative  formulations  that  preserve  long-run  incentives 
for  capital  accumulation  would  serve  equally  well.  For  a  general  discussion 
of  what  is  needed  to  sustain  long-run  growth  in  a  model  of  capital 
accumulation,  see  Grossman and  Helpman  (1991,  ch.2). -5-
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capital,K., this implies K1 - s(w+A+L,r1) -, or V'S
(5) Kt+i s(wtAtL, rt+i).
Equations (3), (4), and (5) determine the dynamic evolution of the economy
(factor prices and capital stock) from any initial stock of capital, K0.
In order to ensure tile existence ox a steaciy state tor tnis economy, we
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(6) A(K) =K1/a.
Vithout further loss of generality, we normalize the size of the population to
two, so that L =1.Then kt =afor all t, and (3) and (4) imply
(3') rt =pforall t,
fA\ cI%r 411 + .t )
— L
where Df'(a.Now since sC.1.) is homogeneous of degree one in its first
-  5- 
(4) 
Product  market  equilibrium  obtains  when  aggregate  investment  equals 
aggregate  savings,  i.e.,  the  sum of  desired  savings  by  the  young  and  desired 
dissavings  by  the  old.  Since  the  old  wish  to  dissave  their  entire  holdings  of 
capital,  Kt,  this  implies  Kt+l  -  Kt  =  s(wtAtL,  rt+l)  -  Kt  ,  or 
(5)  K  t+1  =  s(wtAtL  rt+& 
Equations  (3),  (4),  and  (5)  determine  the  dynamic  evolution  of  the  economy 
(factor  prices  and  capital  stock)  from  any  initial  stock  of  capital,  KO. 
In  order  to  ensure  the  existence  of  a  steady  state  for  this  economy,  we 
take  a  particular  functional  form  for  the  capital  externality,  making  it 
linear  in  the  aggregate  capital  stock;  i.e., 
(6)  A&)  = Kt/a. 
Vithout  further  loss  of  generality,  we normalize  the  size  of  the  population  to 
two,  so  that  L  =  1.  Then  kt  =  a  for  all  t,  and  (3)  and  (4)  imply 
(3’)  rt  = P  for  all  t, 
(4’)  Wt = i(P)  for  all  t, 
where  p  s  f’(a).  Now since  s(s,*)  is  homogeneous of  degree  one  in  its  first -6-
— — A1I. — ,T'L f\ f\
argument, SWAb
.,A(R\ h'nmpc '-I ) , '.'j"."
K÷1 Ks[(p),p]/a. LI 'A.
The capital stock grows at the rate
(7) g=Ia- 1,
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Before 1eavin this section. we note that the dynamic eauilibrium without
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bubblesis not Pareto efficient. For suppose that at time t the old were to
consume as in the above equilibrium while the young saved an additional amount
ds. This would increase the capital stock at t-i-1 by ds and would generate




entirety of this extra output in period t+1 were given to the (then) old, then
the utility of this. generation would rise (since it has set its marginal rate
01 intertemporaisubstitution equal to 1+r+i, tne extra output in tne secona
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inefficiency of the market equilibrium reflects the fact that (small)
individual agents have no incentive to incorporate the spillover effect from
capital in their private investment decisions.
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argument,  s(wtAtL,  rt+l)  = AtLs(wt,rt+l  ).  Then,  after  substituting  (6),  (g’), 
and  (4’),  equation  (5)  becomes 
K  t+l  = Kts[d09  d/a. 
The  capital  stock  grows  at  the  rate 
(7)  gt =  s/a  -  1, 
where  s  E s[d(p),  p] .  By (6),  labor  productivity  A(.)  grows  at  this  same rate 
and  since  I’(.  , .)  has  constant  returns  to  scale,  so  does  per  capita  income. 
Before  leaving  this  section,  we  note  that  the  dynamic  equilibrium  without 
bubbles  is  not  Pareto  efficient.  For  suppose  that  at  time  t  the  old  were  to 
consume as  in  the  above  equilibrium  while  the  young  saved  an  additional  amount 
ds.  This  would  increase  the  capital  stock  at  t+l  by  ds  and  would  generate 
additional  output  of  (dYt+l/dKt+l)ds  =  (Pl  + F,Ja)ds  > rt+lds.  If  the 
entirety  of  this  extra  output  in  period  t+l  were  given  to  the  (then)  old,  then 
the  utility  of  this.generation  would  rise  (since  it  has  set  its  marginal  rate 
of  intertemporal  substitution  equal  to  l+rt+l,  the  extra  output  in  the  second 
period  of  life  yields  more  utility  than  the  loss  from  the  consumption  foregone 
in  the  first  period)  while  no  generation  would  lose.  Of  course,  the 
inefficiency  of  the  market  equilibrium  reflects  the  fact  that  (small) 
individual  agents  have  no  incentive  to  incorporate  the  spillover  effect  from 
capital  in  their  private  investment  decisions. -7-
III. Existence of Asset Bubbles
Ve now assume that the generation that is old at time 0 possesses I paper
assets that are intrinsically wortnless. inat is, tne assets proauce no real
'ri, ,i,i, UU pu dIIU ILL LUiV db iIV UV uciiu •LILc vu Oçi LLC
cetcfn thevniint .nnsitivenrie n (in terms nfnndsfnr esi'h niece r r0
ofpaper. Vould a rational, foresighted, young investor be willing to
purchase one of these assets? Only if she believed that she could resell the
asset when old (i.e., in period 1) to a member of the next young generation
for a price that includes a real rate of return comparable to that available
on other assets. The real (gross) rate of return on alternative assets is
1+r1 units of output in period 1. Therefore, the young investor in period 0
is willing to buy the intrinsically useless asset it sne expects its price in
I — 11.. i. ;,. .,,,, P[10U IU Ut d.L itd b U, 4I 7VuLt51ILa.LwIii aLLJ
f mtif pynpr'f t.hnri(Pnf th nnr tn h n(1+r.inneriod t41. if rr t+i'
-
itis to acauire the asset from the old generation at that time at a price p÷.
If all of these expectations for capital gains on the asset can be fulfilled,
then the intrinsically useless paper can be traded indefinitely; that is,
there can exist a bubble.
Let Bt = bethe aggregate value of the bubble at time t, and assume
for the moment that the self-fulfilling prophecy can be realized. By the
condition of no-arbitrage between bubbles and other assets, we have
Io\ — Ii — lo) Dt+i
Ve define b. B/LL as the aggregate value of the bubble per efficiency unit
of labor.
t
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III.  Existence  of  Asset  Bubbles 
Ve  now  assume that  the  generation  that  is  old  at  time  0  possesses  M paper 
assets  that  are  intrinsically  worthless.  That  is,  the  assets  produce  no  real 
output  and  therefore  generate  no  dividends.  The  old  attempt  to  sell  these 
assets  to  the  young  at  a  positive  price  pO  (in  terms  of  goods)  for  each  piece 
of  paper.  Vould  a  rational,  foresighted,  young  investor  be  willing  to 
purchase  one  of  these  assets ?  Only  if  she  believed  that  she  could  resell  the 
asset  when  old  (i.e.,  in  period  1)  to  a  member of  the  next  young  generation 
for  a  price  that  includes  a  real  rate  of  return  comparable  to  that  available 
on  other  assets.  The  real  (gross)  rate  of  return  on  alternative  assets  is 
l+rl  units  of  output  in  period  1.  Therefore,  the  young  investor  in  period  0 
is  willing  to  buy  the  intrinsically  useless  asset  if  she  expects  its  price  in 
period  1  to  be  at  least  pl  =  (l+rl)po.  Similarly,  the  young  generation  in  any 
period  t  must  expect  the  price  of  the  paper  to  be  pt(l+rt+l)  in  period  t+l,  if 
it  is  to  acquire  the  asset  from  the  old  generation  at  that  time  at  a  price  pt. 
If  all  of  these  expectations  for  capital  gains  on  the  asset  can  be  fulfilled, 
then  the  intrinsically  useless  paper  can  be  traded  indefinitely;  that  is, 
there  can  exist  a  bubble. 
Let  Bt  = ptY  be  the  aggregate  value  of  the  bubble  at  time  t,  and  assume 
for  the  moment that  the  self-fulfilling  prophecy  can  be  realized.  By the 
condition  of  no-arbitrage  between  bubbles  and  other  assets,  we have 
(8)  Bt+l = (1 + rt+l)Bt- 
Ve  define  b,  I  B,/A,L  as  the  aggregate  value  of  the  bubble  per  efficiency  unit 
of  labor. -8-
The young generation must purchase the entirety of existing bubbles from
the old generation in cacti period. me Condition br gooas marxet equiiirium
oecomes
(9 K.1 -K=ALs(w4,r41)
-(B4+K4) '- , I. U- U UTj - U
the left-hand side is net investment, while the right-hand side is the
difference between savings by the young and dissavings by the old (the term in
parentheses on the far right of [9]). Note that (3') and (4') continue to
describe factor prices when At =Kt/a
and L =1.Substituting these
- - - - — I— S — i.* ,_ SI
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theyare, then an initial bubble of size B,. can exist in an economy that has
V -
aninitial capital stock of K. Note that labor productivity grows at rate
so (8) and (3') imply
1 +p
(11) bt÷l =i
Siihstitntin (iflntn (ii' ,iveqsin1p rtiirsive enuation for the —---—--.o --
-  8- 
The  young  generation  must  purchase  the  entirety  of  existing  bubbles  from 
the  old  generation  in  each  period.  The  condition  for  goods  market  equilibrium 
becomes 
(9)  x t+i  -  Kt  =  AtLs(wt,rt+l)  -  (Bt  +  Kt)  ; 
the  left-hand  side  is  net  investment,  while  the  right-hand  side  is  the 
difference  between  savings  by  the  young  and  dissavings  by  the  old  (the  term  in 
parentheses  on  the  far  right  of  [9]).  Note  that  (3’)  and  (4’)  continue  to 
describe  factor  prices  when  At  =  Kt/a  and  L  = 1.  Substituting  these 
expressions  into  (9),  we  derive  Kt+l  =  At(g  -  bt),  or  Kt+l/Kt  =  (S  -  bt)/a. 
Thus, 
(10) 
S -  b, 
gt  =‘a  -  1. 
Ye  now  discuss  whether,  given  an  initial  bubble  of  size  B.  such  that 
bO = Bo/A(Ko),  the  dynamics  described  by  (8)  and  (10)  are  sustainable.  If 
they  are,  then  an  initial  bubble  of  size  B.  can  exist  in  an  economy that  has 
an  initial  capital  stock  of  Ko.  Note  that  labor  productivity  grows  at  rate 
gt,  so  (8)  and  (3’)  imply 
(11) 
l+P 
bt+l  =-bt. 
1  + g, 
Substituting  (10)  into  (11)  gives  a  single,  recursive  equation  for  the 
i -9-
evolution of the value of the bubble per efficiency unit of labor,
1.
Ut
(12) bt+l =a(1+p) h
The curve labelled BB in the top part of figure 1 depicts this relationship
between the (normalized) size of the bubble in successive periods. Clearly,
when this curve lies above the 45 degree line, the bubble is growing relative
to the stock of efficiency labor (and, therefore, aggregate output), whereas
when the curve lies below the 45 degree line, the bubble is shrinking relative
to efficiency labor.
t. : £L.. :i £l IC bCC irumbliC ilULe1Lb ii LLC iLIIbI&LbiC UILIIC OUVUIC lb bULU
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case, the assumed existence of the initial bubble does not lead to any
contradiction. Asymptotically, the bubble becomes arbitrarily small in
relation to the stock of efficiency labor, and the economy converges to the
steady state described in section 2. If, alternatively, the initial size of
the bubble is such that b0 >b,thenthe normalized bubble grows
monotonically over time. Eventually, at some T, bT >. Butthen the
aggregate savings of the young do not suffice to allow them to acquire the
bubble from t?ie old generation at the required price. Inc Old at 1 would nave
I.... ..,.4 .......,..A 1UIL L,IliV1LLUdil.db 1 11UDVWOUIU LIVl. pULILaDCU l.u UUIJUI
frnth (thn\ nltl PnPrtiAn t thf. tinm. Th hiihb1 iinrv1s hk tn
time 0: i.e.. an initial bubble of the assumed size cannot be sustained.
*
Finally,it is possible that bA =b.Thenthe bubble and the economy remain
V
infixed proportion to one another and the economy immediately enters a steady
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evolution  of  the  value  of  the  bubble  per  efficiency  unit  of  labor, 
(12)  b  bt 
t+1  =  a(1  + p)  -  . 
6  -  b, 
The  curve  labelled  BB in  the  top  part  of  figure  1  depicts  this  relationship 
between  the  (normalized)  size  of  the  bubble  in  successive  periods.  Clearly, 
when  this  curve  lies  above  the  45  degree  line,  the  bubble  is  growing  relative 
to  the  stock  of  efficiency  labor  (and,  therefore,  aggregate  output),  whereas 
when  the  curve  lies  below  the  45  degree  line,  the  bubble  is  shrinking  relative 
to  efficiency  labor. 
Ve  see  from  the  figure  that,  if  the  initial  size  of  the  bubble  is  such 
that  b0  < b*,  the  normalized  bubble  shrinks  monotonically  over  time.  In  this 
case,  the  assumed  existence  of  the  initial  bubble  does  not  lead  to  any 
contradiction.  Asymptotically,  the  bubble  becomes arbitrarily  small  in 
relation  to  the  stock  of  efficiency  labor,  and  the  economy converges  to  the 
steady  state  described  in  section  2.  If,  alternatively,  the  initial  size  of 
the  bubble  is  such  that  b0  > b*,  then  the  normalized  bubble  grows 
monotonically  over  time.  Eventually,  at  some T,  bT  >  6.  But  then  the 
aggregate  savings  of  the  young  do  not  suffice  to  allow  them  to  acquire  the 
bubble  from  the  old  generation  at  the  required  price.  The  old  at  T  would  have 
foreseen  this  eventuality  at  T-l,  and  so  would  not  have  purchased  the  bubble 
from  the  (then)  old  generation  at  that  time.  The  bubble  unravels  back  to 
time  0;  i.e.,  an  initial  bubble  of  the  assumed  size  cannot  be  sustained. 
Finally,  it  is  possible  that  b.  = b*.  Then  the  bubble  and  the  economy remain 
in  fixed  proportion  to  one  another  and  the  economy immediately  enters  a  steady - 10 -
state.
Evidently, bubbles can exist in this economy provided their initial size
is no larger than b*. Notice the similarity between the existence condition
for bubbles here and that described by Tirole (1985) for the Diamond economy.
No bubble of any size will be possible if the UB curve is steeper at the
— ,_____ 1.__?lI £ t_ -
origin tnan tile 'aegreejine. me siope 01 tne DD curve at tne origin
'r....h,4J.1c ,.n - 1 ciua Arp/j. L1IU
-, //. UU
-1 is theennnmv'srnwth rate in the absence nf any bubbles. hi1e nis r
the real interest rate, so here, as in Tirole, the existence of bubbles
requires that the growth rate exceeds the interest rate in the equilibrium of
the bubbleless economy.
Of course, in the model with exogenous growth, the bubble cannot affect
the long-run growth rate. flere, that is not true. The bottom portion of the
figure illustrates the effect that bubbles have on the growth rate. The line
CC, depicting equation (10), shows the relationship between the (normalized)
size of the bubble at time t and the growth rate. If the initial bubble
-—t__ __r ___ y* I___ Y1*1I# 'Y1_k L__ L_ tt1_1 nappens o oc oi size D' SUCfl tnat O, nen tne DUDDIC permanentiy
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bubbles reduce the rate nf rovth in every nerind. hut the denressinn nf the
growth rate asymptotically approaches zero as t grows large.) The reason is
straightforward. The existence of the asset bubble diverts savings away from
productive investment in capital, and it is capital investment that drives
long-run growth in the Diamond-Roiner model.
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state. 
Evidently,  bubbles  can  exist  in  this  economy provided  their  initial  size 
is  no  larger  than  b*.  Notice  the  similarity  between  the  existence  condition 
for  bubbles  here  and  that  described  by  Tirole  (1985)  for  the  Diamond  economy. 
NO bubble  of  any  size  will  be  possible  if  the  BB curve  is  steeper  at  the 
origin  than  the  45  degree  line.  The  slope  of  the  BB curve  at  the  origin 
equals  a(l+p)/S.  Thus  bubbles  can  exist  if  an  only  if  s/a  -  1  > p.  But 
s/a  -1  is  the  economy’s  growth  rate  in  the  absence  of  any  bubbles,  while  p  is 
the  real  interest  rate,  so  here,  as  in  Tirole,  the  existence  of  bubbles 
requires  that  the  growth  rate  exceeds  the  interest  rate  in  the  equilibrium  of 
the  bubbleless  economy. 
Of  course,  in  the  model  with  exogenous  growth,  the  bubble  cannot  affect 
the  long-run  growth  rate.  Here,  that  is  not  true.  The  bottom  portion  of  the 
figure  illustrates  the  effect  that  bubbles  have  on  the  growth  rate.  The  line 
GG, depicting  equation  (lo),  shows  the  relationship  between  the  (normalized) 
size  of  the  bubble  at  time  t  and  the  growth  rate.  If  the  initial  bubble 
happens  to  be  of  size  B*  such  that  B*/A(KO)L  = b*,  then  the  bubble  permanently 
lowers  the  rate  of  ,growth  from  g,  =  s/a  -  1  to  g,  = p.  (Smaller  initial 
bubbles  reduce  the  rate  of  growth  in  every  period,  but  the  depression  of  the 
growth  rate  asymptotically  approaches  zero  as  t  grows  large.)  The  reason  is 
straightforward.  The  existence  of  the  asset  bubble  diverts  savings  away  from 
productive  investment  in  capital,  and  it  is  capital  investment  that  drives 
long-run  growth  in  the  Diamond-Bomer  model. — It —
IV. Bubbles and IntertemDoral Efficiency
Tirole (1985, 1990) has shown for the Diamond economy that the
asymptotically bubbly equilibrium (in which the bubble remains in fixed
proportion to the size of the economy in the long run) is intertemporally
efficient. The bubble eliminates overaccumulation of capital, which can arise
in the Diamond model because living generations cannot trade vith the as yet
unborn. In fact, the bubbles can exist in that setting if and only if the
bubbleless equilibrium is inellicient.
,l__ — _,_t_r_._ ___i. _i_'i _f __ t___1 one mignt expect a oiiieren resui in our mouei. ox externaiity-oasea
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efficiency. Bubbles divert savings from productive use in financing capital
accumulation into an unproductive store of value and thereby exacerbate the
existing distortion in the market equilibrium.
Suppose that a bubble of size B0 first appears in the economy at time 0.
Vhat are the welfare implications? The generation that is old at time 0
benefits of course, as their sale of the new asset to the young enables them
to consume more than otherwise. The labor income of the generation that is
young at time 0 depends upon I and A0, both of which are predetermined at
time 0. Their savings accrue interest at rate r+i =pwith or without the
bubble. So this generation, which nas (inairect) utility given y
_.jt.tt1 Iii ....L V1c(p)A0, pj, is nO aiieci.eu oy ne uuuuie. iii. uuequeu ueLdtiuIIbic
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thrfnrnpr2fitnhrrn ftrtimO rns 1 1ahr inrtm than it
wonid have otherwise.
It is interesting to note that the generation that is born at time 1, by
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IV.  Bubbles  and  Intertemporal  Efficiency 
Tirole  (1985,  1990)  has  shown  for  the  Diamond  economy that  the 
asymptotically  bubbly  equilibrium  (in  which  the  bubble  remains  in  fixed 
proportion  to  the  size  of  the  economy in  the  long  run)  is  intertemporally 
efficient.  The  bubble  eliminates  overaccumulation  of  capital,  which  can  arise 
in  the  Diamond  model  because  living  generations  cannot  trade  with  the  as  yet 
unborn.  In  fact,  the  bubbles  can  exist  in  that  setting  if  and  only  if  the 
bubbleless  equilibrium  is  inefficient. 
One might  expect  a  different  result  in  our  model  of  externality-based 
endogenous  growth.  As we  have  seen  at  the  end  of  section  2,  the  economy 
without  bubbles  has  less  capital  formation  than  is  required  for  intertemporal 
efficiency.  Bubbles  divert  savings  from  productive  use  in  financing  capital 
accumulation  into  an  unproductive  store  of  value  and  thereby  exacerbate  the 
existing  distortion  in  the  market  equilibrium. 
Suppose  that  a  bubble  of  size  B.  first  appears  in  the  economy at  time  0. 
Vhat  are  the  welfare  implications  ?  The  generation  that  is  old  at  time  0 
benefits  of  course,  as  their  sale  of  the  new  asset  to  the  young  enables  them 
to  consume more  than  otherwise.  The  labor  income  of  the  generation  that  is 
young  at  time  0  depends  upon  K.  and  Ao,  both  of  which  are  predetermined  at 
time  0.  Their  savings  accrue  interest  at  rate  rt+l  = p  with  or  without  the 
bubble.  So  this  generation,  which  has  (indirect)  utility  given  by 
V[d(p)AO,  p],  is  not  affected  by  the  bubble.  All  subsequent  generations  are 
harmed,  however,  as  growth  of  labor  productivity  is  reduced  by  the  bubble  and 
therefore  each  generation  born  after  time  0  earns  less  labor  income  than  it 
would  have  otherwise. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  generation  that  is  born  at  time  1,  by - 12 -
itself, suffers income losses from the bubble that are sufficiently large that
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tttls generation couia more tnan compensate tne initiai oia ior tneir gain iron
C ,1,, . Ct.4 ..4 L.lIe UULJU.LC iLVUiJ a I1tiDAUIi5ci&iabiVLtO.i
trnpr'Fhhiihh111ov th init.121 nltI tn inerpqp t.hir trniimnHnn n
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thatis young at time 1 to lose wage income in period 1 of (A.1 -A1)(p)=
S S -
A0(-g0)(p), where a circumflex indicates a variable in the equilibrium
vithout bubbles. Noting the growth rates recorded in (7) and (10), we find
- g0
=
b0/a.Thus, the income loss at time 1 equals B0(p)/a. Since this
comes one period later than the gain to the initial old, the value of this
income loss discounted back to time 0 is B0(p)/a(1+p), where we have used the
market interest rate (which equals also the intertemporal rate of substitution
e_i - . -__.'_ I LI - ior every generaion o periorm me aiscounting. now we caicuiate tne
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a(1 + p)
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sauarebrackets on the far rifht-hand side of (13 is Dositive. This
establishes our claim.5
51n fact, it can be shown that generation born after the period in which
the bubble forms suffers a greater loss than the 2am to the initial old
generation (even the generation
born at time n, discounted to time zero, is
-  12  - 
itself,  suffers  income  losses  from  the  bubble  that  are  sufficiently  large  that 
this  generation  could  more  than  compensate  the  initial  old  for  their  gain  from 
the  bubble,  if  only  there  were  a  way  to  effect  this  intergenerational 
transfer.  The  bubble  allows  the  initial  old  to  increase  their  consumption  in 
period  0  by  Bo.  The  slowdown  in  productivity  growth  causes  the  generation 
that  is  young  at  time  1  to  lose  wage  income  in  period  1  of  (i,  -  AI)  = 
A()(&)-  &)M(P)  9  where  a  circumflex  indicates  a  variable  in  the  equilibrium 
without  bubbles.  Noting  the  growth  rates  recorded  in  (7)  and  (lo),  we  find 
i()-  go  = ho/a.  Thus,  the  income  loss  at  time  1  equals  Bod(P)/a.  Since  this 
comes one  period  later  than  the  gain  to  the  initial  old,  the  value  of  this 
income  loss  discounted  back  to  time  0  is  Bog(p)/a(l+p),  where  we  have  used  the 
market  interest  rate  (which  equals  also  the  intertemporal  rate  of  substitution 
for  every  generation)  to  perform  the  discounting.  Now we  calculate  the 
difference  between  the  discounted  loss  to  the  young  at  time  1  and  the  gain  to 
the  initial  old  as 
(13) 
B(+(P) _ *  BO 
O 
= 
a(1 + 14  a(1  +  PI 
Cl(P)  -  a(1 + 141. 
The  existence  condition  for  a  sustainable  bubble  requires  ?J/a -  1  > p,  or 
S > a(1  + p).  Since  the  wealth  constraint  requires  w  =  l(p)  > S,  the  term  in 
square  brackets  on  the  far  right-hand  side  of  (13)  is  positive.  This 
establishes  our  claim.5 
Sin  fact,  it  can  be  shown  that  any 
the  bubble  forms  suffers  a  greater  P 




than  the  gain  to  the  initial  old 
(even  after  allowing  for  discounting).  The  loss  to  the  generation 
orn  at  time  n,  discounted  to  time  zero,  is - 13 -
But the fact that the young born at time 1 could bribe the old at time 0
to "retire" the bubble asset does not wean that the bubble can be madeto
disappear. The problem is that these two generations do not trade with one
another. The transfer front the young at time 1 to the old at time 0 must be
—— -.-. . .. atfl -
ettectect througfl tne generation tnat is young at time u. nen tnis generation
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an"IOU" that is exactly like the bubble asset.6 The young at time 0 divert
savings from capital formation in order to pay the bribe, with the result that
the potential gain from the intergenerational transfer scheme disappears. The
harm caused by the bubble to generations born after tine 0 cannot be avoided
by a simple tax/subsidy scheme that redistributes income across generations.7
4—n
( b.)j.
a(1+p) I J 1=0
Since (p) >> a(1+p), the difference between the loss to the generation




ThisIOU is like a national debt. O'Connell and Zeldes (1986) and Tirole
(1990) have discussed the analogy between asset bubbles and public debt in
overlapping generations models. The analogy ernais,apt in the present
context. See Alogoskoulis and van cler rioeg 1U)ioran anaiysis ul iue
effectsof public debt in an externalities-based model of endogenous growth.
TVelfare of all generations can be improved, however, by a policy that
stimulates investment and causes individuals to internalize the externality
associated with capital formation.
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But  the  fact  that  the  young  born  at  time  1  could  bribe  the  old  at  time  o 
to  “retire”  the  bubble  asset  does  not  mean that  the  bubble  can  be  made to 
disappear.  The  problem  is  that  these  two  generations  do  not  trade  with  one 
another.  The  transfer  from  the  young  at  time  1  to  the  old  at  time  0  must  be 
effected  through  the  generation  that  is  young  at  time  0.  Vhen  this  generation 
pays  the  bribe  to  the  initial  old,  it  will  want  to  collect  (1  + p)  times  the 
amount  that  it  has  laid  out  from  the  young  at  time  1.  In  the  interim,  it  has 
an  “IOU”  that  is  exactly  like  the  bubble  asset.6  The  young  at  time  0  divert 
savings  from  capital  formation  in  order  to  pay  the  bribe,  with  the  result  that 
the  potential  gain  from  the  intergenerational  transfer  scheme disappears.  The 
harm  caused  by  the  bubble  to  generations  born  after  time  0  cannot  be  avoided 
by  a  simple  tax/subsidy  scheme that  redistributes  income  across  generations.7 
A()#(P) 
a”(l+p)” 
[8”-  ~  (S-  bi)]* 
Since  g(p)  > 8  > a(l+p),  the  difference  between  the  loss  to  the  generation 
born  at  time  n  and  the  gain  to  the  old  at  time  0  exceeds 
~  (‘-  bo)[S”-  ~  (‘-  bi)]  >  0. 
aThis  IOU  is  like  a  national  debt.  O’Connell  and  Zeldes  (1986  and  Tirole 
(1990)  have  discussed  the  analogy  between  asset  bubbles  and  pu b  lit  debt  in 
overlappin 
s 
generations  models.  The  analogy  remains  apt  in  the  present 
context.  ee  Alogoskoufis  and  van  der  Ploe 
% 
(1990)  for  an  analysis  of  the 
effects  of  public  debt  in  an  externalities-  ased  model  of  endogenous  growth. 
Velfare  of  all  generations  can  be  improved,  however,  by  a  policy  that 
stimulates  investment  and  causes  individuals  to  internalize  the  externality 
associated  with  capital  formation. - 14 -
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human, or knowledge capital, the existence of an unproductive asset -- one
that yields a financial return but does not contribute to the production of
real output --can be harmful to growth. The unproductive asset, or bubble,
attracts savings away from more productive uses. Each new generation
purchases the asset at least partly at the expense of investment in growth-
promoting capital.
In thispaper, wehaveexamined the conditions under which asset bubbles
___1_ __i_1 _P __1 - — ca exist n asimpie mouei or enuogenous growtn. AS in tne neoclassical
rtwfhpftinE, hiihhlpn 4 +1,o1,. .,,-.,+%, Y''ISIS1 AS USI .I.jUSSSIJA SUMI 1.11 LabC
exceedsthe interest rate in the bubbleless economy. Here. however. the
equilibrium growth rate, like the interest rate, is determined by parameters
of tastes and technology. Bubbles are 'ore likely to be possible when
households are patient (i.e., savings propensities are high for a given
interest rate) and when investments in capital generate spillover benefits to
labor productivity. Vhen bubbles do exist, they retard economic growth along
the transition path to the steady state and possibly even in the long run.
mt...LtL,__ .. -.
me ouooies aiso narm au generations Dorn alter tne period in winch the asset
firQ+ 41,.4. :.t. lJ I AIIb bIL ACCU (.11W L1I bU 1,11W W1&Wj d,b.LV2I 1,11db
benefits from the bubble.
In our model, a bubble can exist only on intrinsically useless assets.
That is, there cannot be any bubble in the price of capital. This is because
new units of an asset must have the same price as old, and it is always
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IV.  Conclusions 
In  settings  where  long-run  growth  is  driven  by  investments  in  physical, 
human,  or  knowledge  capital,  the  existence  of  an  unproductive  asset  --  one 
that  yields  a  financial  return  but  does  not  contribute  to  the  production  of 
real  output  --can  be  harmful  to  growth.  The  unproductive  asset,  or  bubble, 
attracts  savings  away from  more  productive  uses.  Each  new  generation 
purchases  the  asset  at  least  partly  at  the  expense  of  investment  in  growth- 
promoting  capital. 
In  this  paper,  we have  examined  the  conditions  under  which  asset  bubbles 
can  exist  in  a  simple  model  of  endogenous  growth.  As  in  the  neoclassical 
growth  setting,  a  bubble  can  survive  only  if  the  equilibrium  growth  rate 
exceeds  the  interest  rate  in  the  bubbleless  economy.  Here,  however,  the 
equilibrium  growth  rate,  like  the  interest  rate,  is  determined  by  parameters 
of  tastes  and  technology.  Bubbles  are  more  likely  to  be  possible  when 
households  are  patient  (i.e.,  savings  propensities  are  high  for  a  given 
interest  rate)  and  when  investments  in  capital  generate  spillover  benefits  to 
labor  productivity.  Vhen  bubbles  do  exist,  they  retard  economic  growth  along 
the  transition  path  to  the  steady  state  and  possibly  even  in  the  long  run. 
The  bubbles  also  harm  all  generations  born  after  the  period  in  which  the  asset 
first  appears,  and  to  an  extent  that  exceeds  the  gain  to  the  generation  that 
benefits  from  the  bubble. 
In  our  model,  a  bubble  can  exist  only  on  intrinsically  useless  assets. 
That  is,  there  cannot  be  any  bubble  in  the  price  of  capital.  This  is  because 
new  units  of  an  asset  must  have  the  same price  as  old,  and  it  is  always - 15 -
possible to create a new unit of capital at a cost of one unit of output.8
Thus, competition from potential new supply prevents exponential growth in the
price of real capital.
This raises the fundamental question about asset bubbles: what determines
their suppiyi tvery indiv1ual is willing to exchange a worthless piece of
P.PL_ J.ULpubiive d.muuitt vi vuub. ii asei ouvuies uo appear in tne
P&AnAmv+hr nu uv fririrprH'fh1l rif +m hAt, mn1, h41.h
IJ4M  SUOTBIS  UT  UOtW1OJ  1T(1.  ¶UAIU  O  A1I  AU  Ia4.  SI 
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existencewill retard growth? These questions remain to be answered.
8Thjs argument assumes that different units of capital, which are
economic11y indistinguishable in our model, also are physically
indistinguishable. Otherwise, there could be bubbles in the prices of
specificunits of capital. One might say, in such a case, that the capital
is priced at its fundamental value, but that the "names" of specific pieces
of equipment (which are intrinsically useless assets) acquire value as
bubbles.
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possible  to  create  a  new  unit  of  capital  at  a  cost  of  one  unit  of  output.8 
Thus,  competition  from  potential  new  supply  prevents  exponential  growth  in  the 
price  of  real  capital. 
This  raises  the  fundamental  question  about  asset  bubbles:  what  determines 
their  supply ?  Every  individual  is  willing  to  exchange  a  worthless  piece  of 
paper  for  a  positive  amount  of  goods.  If  asset  bubbles  do  appear  in  the 
economy,  is  there  any  nay  to  predict  ahead  of  time  how  many and  which  ones? 
Is  there  any  way to  prevent  their  formation  in  situations  where  their 
existence  will  retard  growth  ?  These  questions  remain  to  be  answered. 
sThis  argument  assumes that  different  units  of  capital,  which  are 
economically  indistinguishable  in  our  model,  also  are  physically 
indistinguishable.  Otherwise,  there  could  be  bubbles  in  the  prices  of 
specific  units  of  capital.  One might  say,  in  such  a  case,  that  the  capital 
is  priced  at  its  fundamental  value,  but  that  the  “names”  of  specific  pieces 
of  equipment  (which  are  intrinsically  useless  assets)  acquire  value  as 
bubbles. - 16 -
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